

Learning from Sun Tzu

Chaplain (Colonel) Douglas M. McCready, U.S. Army Reserve

Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is, of course, a classic. At least six English translations can be found in most large bookstores on bookshelves next to another much cited but little read military favorite, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* (Knopf, New York, 1993).¹ Translator Roger Ames describes *The Art of War* as "the world's foremost classic on military strategy."²

During the Vietnam war, it was popular for Army officers to be seen carrying copies of the works of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung. It is unlikely that many who carried the books read them, and few who read them understood them.

Sun Tzu was a Chinese military leader and philosopher. Little is certain regarding his life, including when he lived. The biography in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Historical Records* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994), dating from the early 1st century B.C., describes Sun Tzu as a contemporary of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) born in what is now Shandong Province. Translator Samuel B. Griffith suggests that Sun Tzu probably lived during the Warring States period (453-221 B.C.) because the military details of *The Art of War* fit that time better than they do the earlier Spring and Autumn period.³

The Warring States period began with eight major states whose shifting alliances and slow consolidation resulted in the first unification of China under the short-lived Qin Empire. Sun Tzu, apparently a military leader for one of the warring states, determined to record his strategic and tactical record for later generations. His work has continued to influence Chinese military writing.

Mao Tse-tung applied Sun Tzu's ideas to his own military writings of the Chinese civil war of the 1930s and 1940s. North Vietnamese command-

ers Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap also drew on Sun Tzu's wisdom, using his ideas first against the French, then against the United States.

This modern history leads many to consider *The Art of War* to be a text for the underdog. In light of the current discussion about asymmetrical warfare, this is an important consideration, but Sun Tzu's ideas are also available to stronger states. In either case, political and military leaders of stronger states (such as the United States) should become familiar with Sun Tzu because if they will not be using his ideas, they must be ready to protect themselves against others who will.

Griffith, a World War II veteran, devotes an appendix to detailing how the Japanese applied Sun Tzu's axioms. He says Japan produced more than 100 editions of *The Art of War* and applied Sun Tzu's wisdom to virtually every aspect of Japanese life, including business. Twenty-first century Americans are less likely to be surprised by business appropriating military strategy than was Griffith in 1963.

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz exemplify two contrasting concepts of war. For Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means. For Sun Tzu, war is one among many political tools national leaders can use to accomplish their ends. While this distinction appears minimal, it translates into the difference between U.S. and North Vietnamese strategy in the Vietnam war. It also explains why the United States lost that war.

In his analysis of the Vietnam war, Harry Summers recounts a conversation between a U.S. Army colonel and his North Vietnamese counterpart in Hanoi after the war. The American said North Vietnam had never defeated the United States on the battle-

field. The North Vietnamese conceded the point but added that it was irrelevant—the war was not about battlefield victories.⁴

Using Clausewitz, Summers details the flaws he believes led to the American defeat in Vietnam; he never mentions Sun Tzu. Many of his points are correct, but in the end they are irrelevant to the U.S. effort in Vietnam because neither Summers nor the strategic decisionmakers who planned the Vietnam war fully understood the nature of the war they were fighting.

North Vietnam and Western Philosophy

The warm reception Summers' book received at the Army's highest level shows that the U.S. military still does not understand what happened in Vietnam. North Vietnamese strategy, like that of other East Asian nations, resembled much more the military philosophy of Sun Tzu than it did the thinking of Clausewitz or other Western strategists. The reported surprise of U.S. military leaders that a small number of Special Forces soldiers could motivate Afghanistan's Northern Alliance army to defeat the Taliban regime without the infusion of large numbers of U.S. ground troops shows that Sun Tzu's lessons still are not understood or accepted by senior leaders.

During the lengthy Indochina War, French and American commanders sought repeatedly and generally unsuccessfully to entice their Viet Minh, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese Army adversaries to engage them under conditions where superior Western firepower, maneuver, and logistics would predetermine the outcome. The French got their set-piece battle at Dien Bien Phu. The United States got its major opportunity at Khe Sanh. The

French defeat was not major in military terms, but it was decisive psychologically and led quickly to a French withdrawal from Indochina.

At Khe Sanh, U.S. forces were decoyed to a border region in terrain only slightly better than at Dien Bien Phu while the Viet Cong mounted a major offensive in the urban areas. American forces held at Khe Sanh, and American and South Vietnamese forces won militarily in the cities; however, the surprise Viet Cong attack had a psychological effect on the U.S. population similar to that of Dien Bien Phu on the French electorate. The United States won the battles, but it lost the war because it did not realize it was not fighting the same war as its adversary. Sun Tzu warns that when we know ourselves but not our enemy, our chance of victory is only about half.

This different understanding of the nature of war characterizes the approach toward warfare that many of the United States' potential opponents have. This approach emphasizes stratagem and maneuver over firepower and seeks to set the terms of conflict even before the opponent is aware conflict exists. More important, this approach recognizes that the decisive battlefield is rarely the one on which troops are deployed. Instead, the battlefield lies in the political will of the opponent, the hearts and minds of its citizens.

Unconventional Warfare

So it is important not only for U.S. generals to understand Sun Tzu's approach to warfare, it is important for their civilian masters, who make the strategic decisions, to understand because their thinking is a key target of the enemy. Changing how we think will not be easy, as it goes against the grain of what has been called the American way of war.

Much of what Sun Tzu teaches falls in the category of what Americans call unconventional warfare. Historically, this has been consigned to a supporting role to the main, conventional effort. While it is true that Sun Tzu's approach is unconventional, he does discuss how large, regular armies should operate against opponents. Conventional warriors

can learn from Sun Tzu as readily as can guerrillas. Conventional and unconventional are in the eye of the beholder, and no one should assume his definitions are normative.

Sun Tzu says defeating the enemy without battle requires greater skill than winning on the battlefield. In saying this, he is stressing maneuver over firepower—that maneuver might involve politics and diplomacy or combat formations. Yet, while Sun Tzu prefers that the military leader defeat his opponent without having to resort to combat, he recognizes this is frequently impossible.

Sun Tzu develops in two ways his idea of victory without combat. The first is to so order the political and diplomatic context that one's opponent has obviously lost before he has even begun to recognize the futility of fighting. The second is to deploy one's own forces in a way that neutralizes the enemy's strategy. His advice that "the best military policy is to attack strategies, next to attack alliances, the next to attack soldiers, and the worst to assault walled cities," shows he prefers diplomatic initiative.⁵

Elsewhere, Sun Tzu says the use of military force is a drain on the treasury no matter how great the victory. American doctrine advocates getting inside the enemy's decision cycle during battle; Sun Tzu says we should seek to get inside the enemy's diplomatic decision cycle so we can avoid battle altogether. Best of all is to get inside the enemy's mind. This way we not only maintain the initiative, but we can control the enemy's response. If we cannot do either of these, we should seek to get inside the enemy's strategic decisionmaking cycle. Doing any of these, however, requires good intelligence, and not the kind of intelligence the United States is best able to collect. Sun Tzu's advice has the greatest possibility of succeeding when the enemy's leadership has been penetrated by human agents; signals and photographic intelligence are much less effective.

One difference between Sun Tzu's approach and the American way of war can be seen as the difference between the Asian game of go and the Western game of chess. In go, the

opponents place their pieces so as to maximize their control and restrict their opponent's options. The enemy loses pieces and the game by being outmaneuvered, not through direct attack. In chess, the goal is to capture the opponent's key piece, the king. This requires territorial control, but one gains that control by capturing enemy pieces so they cannot threaten one's own king and so that they cannot protect their own king.

For military professionals, Sun Tzu notes that the down side of his proposal is that commanders who win without having to resort to battle do not gain a reputation for wisdom or credit for bravery.⁶ The kind of victory Sun Tzu recommends happens without publicity or the usual trappings of military success. I believe a major factor in success is the absence of publicity and parades. Publicity would require the enemy to respond in ways that silence does not.

Sun Tzu offers a way for weaker forces to defeat those more powerful. Because no state or nonstate actor more powerful than the United States currently exists, the approaches Sun Tzu recommends are among those U.S. political and military leaders will face in the coming decades.

Israel's Failure to Heed

Israel's difficulties during its spring 2002 counterterrorist operations reflect a failure to apply Sun Tzu's lessons. As the undisputed military leader in the Middle East, Israel faced the same asymmetrical strategy the United States can expect to face from future opponents. Despite its reputation for the indirect approach and deception operations, Israel massed conventional forces to urban areas suspected of harboring Palestinian terrorists. The result of the Israeli offensive was heavy Israeli military casualties, accusations of heavy Palestinian civilian deaths, a Palestinian propaganda victory, and loss of much international sympathy and support. Among both Israelis and Palestinians, this reinforced the arguments of hard-line leaders and made a nonmilitary solution of the situation even more unlikely.

One crucial Israeli error was its belief that Palestinian fighters in urban camps would offer only token resistance.⁷ A second was its inattention to the propaganda battle. Israel won the military battle of the urban refugee camps, but in doing so created a new pool of suicide bombers; put its major international ally, the United States, in an awkward diplomatic position in the Middle East; allowed itself to be portrayed as an oppressive bully; and turned Yassar Arafat into a hero. A better approach might have been to discredit Arafat and separate him from his Palestinian base, to minimize the use of conventional military force, and to use a propaganda offensive to emphasize Israeli civilian casualties and the Arab states' abandonment of the Palestinians. Israel won the urban battle, but it lost the propaganda and psychological wars.

Sun Tzu said, "All warfare is based on deception. . . . A military leader of wisdom and ability lays deep plans for what other people do not figure on."⁸ U.S. doctrine recognizes the importance of deception in U.S. operations and stresses the importance of intelligence, but Americans have proven much better at planning their own deception actions than recognizing those of their enemies. The 1968 Tet offensive is an excellent example of this. While Tet was a U.S. and South Vietnamese military victory, it was a political and propaganda disaster and became the turning point that led to U.S. withdrawal from the war. While Sun Tzu's ideas about using deception are mostly common sense, they are most often tools for the weak to use against the strong. With overwhelming U.S. military power a key factor in the modern world, Sun Tzu's comments on deception operations should be a warning to strategic planners.

Sun Tzu Everywhere and Nowhere

The sort of deception Sun Tzu talks about does not come from studying manuals. It is a way of thinking and being, a way that is alien to Western intellectual and cultural traditions. Sun Tzu describes it thus:

*So veiled and subtle,
To the point of having
no form;
So mysterious and
miraculous,
To the point of
making no sound.
Therefore he can be
arbiter of the
enemy's fate.⁹*

Sun Tzu's army is everywhere and yet nowhere. Griffith translates the beginning of the verse as "Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace."¹⁰ This is the epitome of the indirect approach. There are no heavy battalions or massed batteries in this picture. They come into view only if the strategy of indirection and deception fails or is left untried.

Linked with deception is an emphasis on psychological warfare directed against enemy soldiers to destroy their morale and against enemy leaders to overstress them and create tension between them. The goal is to defeat the enemy before the battle so the outcome of the battle is a foregone conclusion or so the enemy cannot appear on the battlefield. Sun Tzu's counsel is most effective where leaders feel the need to make every significant decision, ignoring battle rhythm and sleep plans. The U.S. military, particularly its Reserve Components, is weak at this point.

Of the 13 chapters in *The Art of War*, one is devoted entirely to examining the role of intelligence in wartime. The other 12 include intelligence where appropriate to their subject. Sun Tzu's strategy of deception and maneuver depends much more on good intelligence than does a strategy emphasizing large armies, firepower, and decisive battles. The chapter titled "Using Spies" exemplifies an approach to intelligence markedly different from the modern American emphasis on high-tech surveillance and signals interception. These have their own great value, but neither offers insight into enemy leaders' thinking in the way human intelligence does. Sun Tzu says "intelligence is of the essence in warfare—it is what the armies depend upon in their every move."¹¹

As Chinese commentators on Sun Tzu make clear, the intelligence essential to this approach to war in-

cludes the names of key enemy personnel, as well as their personalities and character. A leader will then know his enemies' strengths and weaknesses and also their preferred behavior, and their susceptibility to deception operations. While signal intelligence might provide some of this knowledge, most of it can only come through human agents who know personally the enemy leaders. During the American Civil War, commanders on both sides were successful in deception operations because they had known and worked with their opposite numbers for many years before the war. This long-term personal contact was itself good intelligence and was supplemented by the use of spies. Increasingly sophisticated counters to technical intelligence-collection require a return to the use of human agents.

Many Western and Chinese scholars have concluded Sun Tzu believed noncombat victories are usually possible. He certainly believed them preferable, but the fact that the overwhelming majority of *The Art of War* is about how to fight seems to show he considered noncombat victory an ideal rarely realized.

Sun Tzu also believed political rulers should leave strategy and tactics entirely to their generals. He even says generals should ignore their civilian leaders when the military situation requires.¹² While this might work in authoritarian societies, it is incompatible with modern democratic societies because it denies civilian control of the military. It also seems to be inconsistent with Sun Tzu's understanding of war as one aspect of a multifaceted approach to interstate relations. Such an understanding seems to require overall control of every part of the approach by the political ruler. While it is true that ignorant civilian leadership is harmful to the military effort, the solution is not civilian uninvolvedness, but informed civilian involvement.

Both Sun Tzu and his ancient Chinese commentators say success in battle sometimes depends on placing soldiers in positions where they must fight or die. This is not part of the American way of war. Nonetheless, we should recognize that for other cultures this is standard procedure,

and it will affect the tactics of U.S. units facing such enemies.

Modern international relations specialists in the Realist tradition, such as Robert Kaplan, claim Sun Tzu as one of their own. A careful reading of *The Art of War* calls this claim into question. Sun Tzu writes, "The expert in using the military builds upon the way (*tao*) and holds fast to military regulations, and thus is able to be the arbiter of victory and defeat."¹³ Tu Mu's commentary on this passage says, "The *Tao* is the way of humanity and justice. . . . Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions."¹⁴ Tu Mu's Sun Tzu is concerned about the character of the military leader because good character is essential to victory.

Know Your Enemy or Lose Half the Battles

Sun Tzu's military thinking is not the last word in strategy, but it is a source from which Western military and political leaders can learn much. It represents an approach to conflict against which the United States has enjoyed tactical success at the cost of strategic defeat. Seriously considering a strategic approach that influences East and Southeast Asian political and military strategy (especially that of China) will richly repay the effort. As Sun Tzu himself wrote:

*He who knows the enemy
and himself
Will never in a hundred
battles be at risk;
He who does not know the
enemy but knows himself
Will sometimes win and
sometimes lose;
He who knows neither the
enemy nor himself
Will be at risk in every
battle.¹⁵*

Too often, American knowledge of its foes has been limited to easily measurable economic and military data, and it has overlooked the much more important cultural, historical, and psychological elements. The way to minimize casualties has been to employ massive doses of firepower rather than using a strategy that seeks to defeat the enemy be-

fore he can muster his forces on the field of battle.

In the coming decades, with the United States remaining the world's dominant military force, employing Sun Tzu's strategic lessons will be more important than ever. The United States might not incorporate all of Sun Tzu's lessons into its offensive strategy, but it will face opponents who use these lessons, or similar lessons, against the United States. Opponents recognize that direct confrontation with the United States can only result in their defeat. **MR**

NOTES

1. I use the recent translation of Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated and edited by Roger Ames (New York: Ballentine, 1993). The book includes material discovered after Samuel B. Griffith's well-known translation of Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford) was published in 1971. Many specialists consider Ames a more accurate translation.
2. Ames, 35.
3. Griffith challenges the traditional earlier Chinese dating of Sun Tzu and argues that the political and military situation Sun Tzu describes did not exist before the Warring States period. Although Griffith is unsure whether Sun Tzu was an actual historical figure, he believes the text is from the 4th century B.C.
4. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 1.
5. Ames, 111.

6. Ibid., 116.
7. James Bennett and David Rohde, "In Rubble of a Refugee Camp, Bitter Lessons for 2 Enemies," *The New York Times*, 21 April 2002, 1.
8. Griffith, 17.
9. Ames, 123.
10. Griffith, 97.
11. Ames, 171.
12. In *Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline & the Law of War* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), Mark J. Osiel offers a more sympathetic reading of Sun Tzu's counsel that military leaders should disobey their civilian superiors under certain circumstances (317). I think, however, that Sun Tzu approaches the subject with an understanding of civil-military relations that Osiel would consider unacceptable.
13. Ames, 116.
14. Griffith, 88.
15. Ames, 113.

Chaplain (Colonel) Douglas M. McCready, U.S. Army Reserve, is the Installation Management Agency Chaplain, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command Chaplain's Office, Fort Monroe, Virginia. He received a B.A. and an M.S. from the University of Pennsylvania, a Ph.D. from Temple University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. His assignments as chaplain include 2-111 Infantry Battalion, 28th Division Artillery, assistant division chaplain, and 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy, and State Chaplain for the Pennsylvania National Guard.

Free Unit Subscriptions

Unit subscriptions are free and based on the following distribution:

□ Headquarters of major commands, corps, divisions, major staff agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, Reserve commands, and Cadet Command organizations:

1 per 10 assigned field grade officers.

□ Active and Reserve brigades and battalions: 1 per 5 assigned field grade officers.

□ Medical commands, hospitals, and units: 1 per 25 assigned field grade officers.

□ To order:

- Write: *Military Review*, Attention: Managing Editor, Building 77, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254.
- Call: DSN 552-9327 or commercial (913) 684-9327.
- E-mail: milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil.

MR Book Reviews

BETRAYAL AND TREASON: Violations of Trust and Loyalty, Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2001, 401 pages, \$35.00.

Nachman Ben-Yehuda is an Israeli sociologist specializing in the study of deviance. *Betrayal and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty* is a fascinating, original, and creative book written with a reasonable degree of attention to the needs of the reader. There is no jargon to speak of, and there are occasional flashes of insight.

We usually think of treason as a violation of law, but for Ben-Yehuda, treason is a moral offense that requires action, normally clandestine, that betrays the trust and loyalty of the traitor's community. Treason situates itself at the end of a continuum whose other end is the innocuous white lie, the illicit affair. There is no qualitative difference across the continuum; violation of trust and loyalty produces betrayal. Ben-Yehuda expends almost a third of the text developing this theory of the continuum, the universality of betrayal, and the nature of treason.

Of course it is more difficult to recognize treason in fact than in theory. By sampling the many cases of purported betrayal, Ben-Yehuda reveals that there are always extenuating and complicating circumstances. What appears to be clear treason or other betrayal is not necessarily so. Sometimes the seeming betrayal is a case of being honest and open about being loyal to a higher or different call.

Those we do not trust cannot betray us. Ben-Yehuda would have us consider the spy, especially the mole. Not being originally of the community, the mole cannot really betray. His loyalty is elsewhere. Consider the turncoat, such as Benedict Arnold, during a time of mixed and shifting loyalties. Or consider the many, including King Edward VIII, whose loyalties lay with fascism before fascism was the enemy. Their

crime, if any, was to be consistent, faithful, and loyal to an idea.

According to Ben-Yehuda, there are others who seemingly betray. The collaborator's loyalty might be to the greater good of the nation—loyalty to the people instead of merely the government. The Vichy leaders, Philippe Petain and Pierre Laval, fall into this category, as do the Judenrat, the Jewish collaborators with the Nazi deportations. And, as in the case of Tokyo Rose, collaboration can be involuntary, a matter of doing whatever is necessary for survival. Treason? Not necessarily.

Some traitors become heroes over time and vice versa. La Malinche in Mexico is an example of one who moved from hero to villain when the European perspective gave way to the indigenous perspective. And, there is a difference of perspective. Benedict Arnold is no traitor in England; Nathan Hale is no betrayer in the United States.

This book is loaded with examples, all trying to make the point that defining treason is not quite as easy as believed. Treason is much more subtle, more nebulous, more case-specific on the sliding and shifting continuum. It is easy to shout "treason"; it is much harder to demonstrate that treason is really the case.

John Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Yukon, Oklahoma

AFGHANISTAN'S ENDLESS WAR: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban, Larry P. Goodson, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2002, 264 pages, \$22.50.

Working on his doctoral dissertation and armed with a grant from the American Institute for Pakistan studies, Associate Professor Larry P. Goodson became hooked on the region. His first book is a great find for those with little knowledge about modern Afghanistan. The easy-to-read book delves into the events that have shaped a war-torn country and the character of its people.

The first chapter eloquently describes four factors that are obstacles to nation-building in Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan's population features deep, multifaceted cleavages. Primarily, people are divided ethnically and linguistically and further subdivided into tribes and sectarian and racial divisions. Second, although Afghans are united by faith, local customs are interwoven into religion, causing variations in the way Islam is practiced and interpreted. Third, the Afghan social system is based solely on communal loyalties, emphasizing tribe above state. Fourth, Afghanistan's rugged terrain serves to isolate it, not only internationally, but also from the central government in Kabul. These factors undermine any efforts at establishing a viable government.

Although the nation possesses Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Aimaq populations, the Pushtuns have led the country since the mid-18th century. Goodson identifies the major groupings of Pushtuns: the Durrani, who ruled from 1749 to 1978; the Ghilzais with whom the Durrani compete for power; and a patchwork of 11 smaller tribes classified as true Pushtuns.

Pushtun dominance ensured the adoption of their tribal code as the law of the land. Known as *push-tunwali*, the tribal code includes such basic concepts as *melmastia* (hospitality), *nanawati* (asylum), *badal* (revenge), and *ghayrat* (defense of honor). The Pushtun tradition also includes the convening of the tribal council also known as *jirga* to resolve major issues. Non-Pushtuns resent such ascendancy and dominance and have attempted to destabilize the ruling ethnic group. This begins to explain why the nation continues to lapse into civil war after foreign enemies have been defeated.

In trying to understand the totality of the Soviet intervention of

Afghanistan and beyond (from 1978 to 1998), Goodson identifies eight distinct phases of the decade-long war. Each phase averages 35 months in length and represents major changes in political and military strategy. The first four phases primarily deal with Afghan communists and Soviets trying to subdue the Mujahideen. The next two phases deal with methods the communists used to extricate themselves. The final two phases deal with the civil strife on the departure of Soviet forces and the rise of the Taliban. The Mujahideen's victory was due to four factors: the nature of the insurgency; the refugees support of the insurgents; the involvement of outside actors in support of the insurgents; and the Soviet Union's economic plight that eventually led to downfall. The seventh and eighth phases see a marked increase in radical Islamic thought exported from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as those countries provided weapons to Mujahideen forces advancing their cause.

In an effort to open the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan regions to Pakistani trade, the Taliban became instrumental in subduing warring factions who hampered trade. As it set about redressing wrongs, the Taliban had the initial support of the Afghans. Once in power, they knew only fighting and an extremist brand of Deobandi-Wahabi Islam. Not knowing anything about running a country, they retreated into a cruel abyss of religious fervor.

The book ends with Goodson's predictions about the future of Afghanistan. Because Goodson wrote his book before 9/11, he assumes the Taliban will continue in power. Of the several topics he addresses on Afghanistan's reconstruction, one is CENTGAS, a conglomerate that earns substantial revenue piping Central Asian natural gas across Afghanistan. Goodson also addresses agricultural rehabilitation, promoting crop substitution to curb opium growth and efforts to de-mine productive lands.

The book is an excellent primer on Afghanistan and is highly recommended for those wanting a quick orientation on the socioeconomic,

political, and historical issues facing the region. The appendix contains a good who's who in modern Afghanistan and how powerful they or their political parties are.

LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland

TANK: The Progress of the Monstrous War Machine, Patrick Wright, Viking Press, NY, 2002, 508 pages, \$29.95.

The tank is the embodiment of modern war. *Tank* is a penetrating look at this centerpiece of modern military technology. From the boxy monstrosities that clanked over trenches and broke the stalemate in World War I to the M1 tank that ruled the battlefield during the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the tank has dominated military theory and practice throughout the 20th century.

Author Patrick Wright's exhaustive research offers a compendium of facts usually eclipsed in conventional military or technical histories. Wright argues that the tank subsequently began to appear primarily as a tool governments used to control their own people. A professor of modern cultural studies at the United Kingdom's Nottingham Trent University, Wright brings vital social and micro-historical data to military history and fleshes out the story of one of the 20th century's most powerful, destructive, and highly symbolic creations.

LTC Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA,
Vincenza, Italy

WAR STORIES: Remembering World War II, Elizabeth Mullener, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2002, 332 pages, \$34.95.

With what Tom Brokaw calls the "greatest generation" vanishing at a rapid rate, it is not surprising to see more memoirs and personal histories appearing that describe individual recollections of World War II. *War Stories*, by *New Orleans Times-Picayune* reporter Elizabeth Mullener, is a collection of 53 interviews gathered over a dozen years with veterans and civilians whose experiences span German dictator Adolf Hitler's 1939 invasion of Poland to the Nuremberg trials. These oral histories tend to reflect the view from the ground rather

than from the top since most of the stars said their pieces years ago. For example, one piece is from a former Polish cavalry officer who reports his army's rapid collapse in the face of Germany's blitzkrieg, the first major application of combined arms. The harsh life under German occupation in Norway and Belgium are grim reminders of the actions that brought the last Nazi leaders to the gallows.

Soldiers, sailors, and airmen describe U.S. Army General George S. Patton's battlefield presence, Japan's surrender, and some of the war's fiercest battles in Europe and the Pacific, from Corregidor and Midway to the Bulge and Okinawa. The demise of the segregated army that created the Red Ball Express and the Tuskegee airmen marks a significant advance in the civilization of American society. That each of these war stories could be found in a single city indicates the totality of America's engagement. An introduction and cogent comments by Stephen Ambrose interspersed throughout the text add meaningful perspective. *War Stories* is nothing less than the story of America's rise to the greatness that inspired Brokaw's homage.

COL John W. Messer, USAR,
Retired, Ludington, Michigan

MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF PANAMANIAN POLITICS, Robert C. Harding II, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2001, 233 pages, \$39.95.

Any discussion of Latin American politics would be incomplete without parallel dialogues on Latin American militaries and U.S. influence in the region; all are irrevocably intertwined, mutually supporting, and communally corrupting. Robert C. Harding's *Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics* documents this compelling triumvirate and explores the historical relationships between Panamanian military and civilian institutions, as well as the significant role of the United States in Panama's difficult democratic evolution.

An assistant professor of international relations and Spanish at Lynchburg College, Virginia, Harding provides a focused, methodical study of the Panamanian military, whose prominent influence on the politics of the nation culminated in the 1968

coup and complete breakdown of democracy in Panama. In its quest for autonomy and independence, Panama has much in common with its Latin American neighbors, yet its central hemispheric location—specifically the Panama Canal—afforded the country international significance during much of the 20th century. Panama's struggles were played on the world stage, and its *caudillos* were world players.

Unique for its focus on the military's influence, the book provides an uncharacteristically frank assessment of the United States's role in Panama's development. Howard J. Wiarda in *Democracy and its Discontents: Development, Interdependence, and U.S. Policy in Latin America* (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, MD, 1995) says that America's irregular, inconsistent policy, alternating between benign neglect and dramatic intervention, profoundly affected the changes in leadership there. Harding does well in highlighting the consequences of well-intended but fickle U.S. policy initiatives such as the Monroe Doctrine, Teddy Roosevelt's Big Stick, and the Mann Doctrine—"A buck in the pocket and a kick in the ass." That a perverted form of militaristic democracy developed in the region is no surprise.

As Harding clearly recognizes, modern Panama is very much a reflection of its century-long struggle to balance civilian democratic institutions, military intervention, and U.S. influence. The canal, now fully Panamanian owned and operated, carries great economic benefit and is symbolic of a nation reborn, wrought with nationalistic potential. But the military pendulum might now have swung too far. Panama's democracy is still fragile, threatened not by internal groups, but by regional and transnational narcotics operations and insurgencies, particularly spillover from Colombia. Panama no longer has a military force, and there is no U.S. military presence to deter such threats.

Harding's book is important reading for policymakers trying to shape and support emerging democracies

in Latin America. Most important, the book carries a warning about the consequences of failed or even forgotten policies in the region.

MAJ Jennifer Buckner, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MANAGING THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS, Ron Matthews and John Treddenick, eds., Palgrave, NY, 2001, 273 pages, \$75.00.

Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs, which surveys a broad range of issues within today's rapidly changing military environment, includes discussions on the idea of the revolution; its implications; economic and financial issues; changes in system acquisition and technology; and the views of Russian and Chinese militaries. The primary focus is on European, especially British, perspectives with respect to the standard of military capability established by the United States. An expert in a particular field of study writes each chapter.

Instead of attempting to explore long-range geopolitical implications and causes of recent significant changes in warfare, the authors focus on the changes that have occurred in the U.S. defense process and the direct causes of those changes. The essayists review in detail such events as drastic increases in command and control expenditures and acquisition reform. The writers make multiple comparisons of current and planned U.S. expenditures and methods to those planned and used in Western European countries.

The editors' purpose is to fill a perceived gap. They feel that no previous work has systematically covered the wide range of issues the revolution in military affairs (RMA) includes and that this must be dealt with if Europeans are to maintain their ability to operate alongside U.S. forces. From this perspective, the authors have succeeded. They outline many of the key issues facing defense establishments in the near future by reviewing the different aspects of U.S. system development and procurement as a guide to discussing areas in which European countries should focus in the immediate future. This approach leads to

a volume that is in many ways a concise encyclopedia of U.S. activities and plans relating to military procurement and organizational structure.

Manuel De Landa in *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (Urzone Inc., New York, 1991), traces the history of several different families of modern weapon systems in order to explore the driving factors behind ongoing changes in warfare. *Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs*, however, offers only a cursory glance into different functional areas affecting ongoing changes in warfare. This leaves one asking for deeper explanations of how and why these parallel actions by the United States have resulted in such a dramatic increase in capability as compared to those of European countries.

The chapters dealing with Russia and China, although presented almost as an afterthought, are in some ways the most revealing. Not only do the authors provide a concise summary of the state of affairs in these nations' defense establishments, they explore some of the detailed goals these two critical countries have outlined for the future. The chapter on China by Dennis J. Blasko is especially useful in that it lays out the Chinese perspective on U.S. capabilities and their planned response. He describes the transformations, variables, and specific focus areas that the Chinese research and development establishment has undertaken to create a People's Liberation Army capable of defending China "if necessary, some distance from its shores."

While none of the analyses and figures is surprising, nor even overly insightful, the book succeeds in creating a handy reference for those working outside the U.S. defense establishment who do not require in-depth information on a given topic. The scope of the book is broad, which enhances the encyclopedic effect and further detracts from the depth of analysis.

Although short on analysis, *Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs* is useful for those who need an introduction to the various aspects of the organizational issues that have produced the U.S. lead in

warfighting technology. However, it will not provide any new revelations to those who work these issues on a daily basis.

MAJ Chris D. Crawford, USAF,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COMMANDING CHANGE: War Winning Strategies for Organizational Change, Murray Davies, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2001, \$62.50.

The dynamics that force organizational change in the civilian sector are normally judged on the ability to gain profits. Military units that encounter the dynamics of change on the battlefield can be trapped because of the inability to divert from outmoded doctrine or obsolete weapons systems. Murray Davies tackles the problem of military organizational change in *Commanding Change: War Winning Military Strategies for Organizational Change*. He discusses what motivates military organizations to seek alternatives to meet new doctrinal and technological threats by comparing and contrasting similar changes in corporations. Corporations seek change to increase profits. The military seeks change to save lives and to achieve victory.

Davies analyzes several historical case studies to find organizational commonalities to each change, discussing each evolution or revolution of military affairs that leads to what he calls Military Change Management Strategy (MCMS). The MCMS forms the baseline for military organizational change, defeating the distracters that would adversely affect the goal of modernizing weapons or doctrine. The MCMS then leads to a Military Change Management Plan (MCMP), and Davies sees it as one under constant evolution as information and technology continue to develop. However, his MCMP principles can be used as a guide to effect change working within the dimensions of human behavior and time. The final dynamic of leadership concludes his book, for he recognizes that without leadership, any change to an organization is fruitless.

Davies writes well on the evolution and revolution of military affairs and how they relate to organizational change. However, he uses a weak ar-

gument when he tries to analogize military and civilian sector change. His chapter "Military Versus Civilian Change" asserts only that in the civilian sector, change is brought about by a decline in profits. He does not provide any concrete historical examples of change in the civilian sector as he does in the military profession that would strengthen his argument. Despite this weakness, Davies provides a good treatment of military organizational change, and he discusses how to surmount those forces that detract from alternatives in how we will fight on future battlefields.

MAJ Mark L. Shepard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR OVER KOSOVO: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds., Columbia University Press, NY, 2001, 223 pages, \$22.50.

What is the only shooting war that NATO has fought? Has America ever fought a war without a combat casualty? Has America ever fought a war without a bona fide military hero emerging? Has America ever fought a war for primarily humanitarian reasons? *War Over Kosovo* answers all of these questions and more.

The review of the facts surrounding the 1999 U.S.-led NATO air war is useful, but the beauty of the book is its insightful analysis of the grand security strategy implications for the United States and the world. *War Over Kosovo* is a compendium of seven erudite national strategy thinkers. The authors' unifying proposition is that the Kosovo war is worthy of study because of the implications it holds for the "way developed countries will wage war in years to come." Their predictive analysis is accurate when viewed in light of the current war against global terrorism.

Essayist William Arkin begins the study with a thorough narrative and analysis of the predominantly air campaign. His discourse on the problems of near-instantaneous information and its effect on decisionmaking highlight his analysis. He recounts the delicate decisionmaking among the NATO coalition's high command and the reservation of a critical targeting decision at the U.S. National

Command Authority level.

Eliot Cohen discusses the real disconnect between U.S. Cold War doctrine and the new way of war evident in the Kosovo campaign. He also reviews the phenomenon of casualty sensitivity plus an imbalance in U.S. high-level civil-military relations.

James Kurth postulates effectively that the Kosovo war was the first campaign in a new U.S. global grand strategy. He sees a grand strategy that portends a rise in new types of institutional ideological objectives rather than traditional security and economic objectives. He cautions against this new type of strategy, asserting that the Kosovo war was thrice flawed because it was fought to enlarge NATO, was justified as a humanitarian campaign, and essentially disregarded Russia and China.

Anatol Lieven echoes Kurth's admonishment of a neo-imperial strategy for the West, and he explores the proposition that the vaunted U.S. and NATO military superiority is potentially more relative than absolute. He underscores the necessity of combining technology with stamina, casualties, ruthlessness, and adaptability and forecasts that urban combat against well-armed nonstate actors is the near-term challenge for the West.

Alberto R. Coll analyzes the moral dimension of warfare that the Kosovo campaign faced. Was there just cause to intervene militarily to end the ethnic cleansing? Did NATO have the lawful authority? Was war NATO's last resort? Did NATO use morally justifiable means in the conduct of the war? Was this campaign a manifestation of new moral obligations for the United States? Coll answers these questions and efficiently encapsulates the morality debate. Andrew Bacevich sees resurgence, à la Vietnam, in a troubled relationship between Carl von Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" of the state, people, and army (military). Bacevich postulates that the need to balance the trinity might be beyond American interests. If so, Bacevich deduces that it foreshadows immense difficulties for U.S. security strategy.

Michael Vickers places the use of technology in the war within the cur-

rent debate of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). He reasons that the neglect in changing Cold War doctrine has left the RMA unfulfilled. He argues that the campaign in Kosovo underscored the necessity for transforming organization and doctrine within the military.

Not only do I recommend *War Over Kosovo*, I feel it is imperative that all military professionals internalize the book's conclusions. The analyses are prescient, complementary, and well supported. Study of the profession of arms demands that this wise work by seven national strategy thinkers be included in any professional library.

MAJ Michael A. Wormley, USAF,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

KOREA'S FUTURE AND THE GREAT POWERS, Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, eds., University of Washington Press: Seattle, 2001, 361 pages, \$22.95.

Among the foremost of security issues in Asia, indeed the world, is the future of the Korean peninsula and its 67 million inhabitants. The question of reunification presents serious issues. In *Korea's Future and the Great Powers*, editors Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, under the auspices of The National Bureau of Asian Research, compiled a superb collection of articles and essays by leading scholars and diplomats of Asian security.

At the crossroads of northeast Asia, astride both China and Japan, Korea has long concerned all who have an interest in Pacific peace and prosperity. The nations with historical and current vital interests in Korea include China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. All have fought wars in the past century either directly or indirectly because of the Korean peninsula's strategic value. The current 50-year-old standoff between south and north causes great concern and substantial investment in manpower, political capital, and real capital of all these powers. Within that context, this book provides a comprehensive evaluation of almost every aspect of Korea's possible futures.

Not enough has been written in the United States on how to resolve

the tension between the prosperous Republic of Korea and the failing, but dangerous, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. What future scenarios imply for Asian security and the great powers has also not been addressed adequately. This book, which fills these requirements successfully, contains a range of essays in which scholars, diplomats, and economists deliver a comprehensive overview of the salient issues of the Korean problem. The issues the essayists discuss range from the economic costs of reunification to the effects of continuing the status quo and how these influence the power balance between the great powers. Specific articles address Korean reunification, and the overall security environment of northeast Asia receives adequate treatment as well.

This book provides enlightening views about complex issues and should be on the desk of every diplomat, strategist, and national security functionary.

MAJ William Todd Harmon, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

IMPROVING ARMY PLANNING FOR FUTURE MULTINATIONAL COALITION OPERATIONS, Thomas S. Szayna, Frances M. Lussier, Krista Magras, Olga Oliker, Michele Zanini, Robert Howe, Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 346 pages, \$25.00.

In this book, the authors' thesis is that a more effective mechanism to manage Army resources for international activities (IA) is necessary to enable a more efficient prioritization of multinational force compatibility (MFC) efforts that contribute to the successful planning and conduct of combined operations. The study, conducted by Rand analysts, supports Department of the Army (DA) IA planning intended to enhance ground coalition operations. The authors identify better administrative mechanisms and processes with which to develop an empirically based, long-term MFC plan.

A large portion of the publication is dedicated to regionally organized, graphic and concisely worded country evaluations indicating each state's proclivity to participate with the United States in a multinational operation. The authors offer their

analyses as a way to identify enduring coalition partnerships, to isolate interoperability shortcomings of potential partners, to match cooperative efforts to specific shortcomings, and to assess the cost effectiveness of IA programs. Ultimately, the Rand researchers posit that Army preparations for cooperation with other armies, based on knowledge of partner-state contribution capabilities, facilitate proper resourcing and effective execution of Title 10 requirements.

The authors highlight the trend toward coalition operations as a preface to the relevance of their research on MFC. Rand points to the importance of being able to accurately identify willing coalition partners and to prioritize focused programs to achieve operational compatibility at targeted levels of the mission spectrum. To perform this process effectively and globally with finite resources, DA should play a stronger role in the theater security cooperation planning process to achieve national-level goals for improving coalition readiness. The text notes that it is currently problematic to affect such a process because it is difficult to determine devoted IA funds and even more difficult to monitor and influence IA funding allotments since international activities are integrated within such a large part of Army operations. Rand advocates a more integrated system for planning Army MFC efforts and the subsequent development of a long-term MFC plan.

The authors convincingly support their theme of enhancing Army processes to effectively manage IA and MFC efforts with a methodical approach and a fairly well explained data set of 109 potential coalition partners. The authors' effectiveness is best exemplified by the combination of analytical rigor and logic applied in developing a prioritized, tiered list of potential contributors to coalition operations, which correlates multiple variables to measure states' propensity to offer compatible forces.

Sponsored by the Military Deputy to the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army for International Affairs (DUSA-IA). The study's value and

credibility is enhanced by the cooperation of the DUSA-IA staff as well as that from other DA, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel.

This study provides value to military and defense professionals concerned with U.S. Army operations at national and theater levels. The thorough, concise country data offers utility as a quick reference for those vested in the compatibility and interoperability of prospective coalition ground forces. Thus, the research is most germane to the Army, but it could also serve the interests of U.S. unified commands and the Joint Staff.

**MAJ Vincent Lee Freeman, Jr.,
USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

IRAN'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA, Daniel L. Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerold Green, Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 133 pages, \$15.00.

Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era is another excellent work from the Rand Corporation. Daniel L. Byman and his team have produced a clear, concise study that explains in detail the changing nature of Iran's security policy. They begin with the sources of Iran's security policy, including ideological as well as internal and external factors. The team also examines Iran's military institutions; the regular armed forces (the Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); their agendas; and their positions in the decisionmaking system. The authors detail these military institutions' relationships and interactions with Iran's informal, convoluted decisionmaking system. Finally, the authors examine the actual policies produced to develop an understanding of the character of Iran's security policy today and how Iran's policies have changed over the last 20 years.

After conducting this exploration of Iran's behavior, the Rand team shows that Iranian security policymakers have shifted from the adventurism of their early years to more cautious and prudent policies. The fervor of Islamic fundamentalism and Persian nationalism were the two primary drivers of Iran's security policy.

But their security policy has changed. The primary drivers today are geopolitics, ethnicity, and economics. As Byman and his team show, Iran's behavior now is more aimed at preserving the state and the political regime than at exporting and invigorating a worldwide Islamic revolution.

The authors cover in detail Iran's foreign policy with Iraq; Russia; China; Turkey; Afghanistan; Pakistan; the Gulf States; Central Asia and the Caucasus; Syria and Lebanon; Israel; Europe; and the United States. They also examine Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and the country's policies toward Islamic radicals and explain the transitions that Iranian military institutions have undergone since the revolution. The IRGC has become more professional, shifting from protecting the revolutionary government to protecting the state itself, internally and externally. The IRGC operates and supports Islamic uprisings in other states. As Byman and his team show, Iran operates and supports these groups more for geopolitical reasons and less for ideological ones.

Closely examining these policies and the shifts in Iran's military institutions reveals a number of key points that the authors outline. Most important, "The Islamic Republic is increasingly prudent, Iran's policies toward Israel and the United States are often the exception to its overall shift toward prudence, and Iran's ideology is often a mask for realpolitik." At the most basic level, the sources of adventurism—Islam and Persian nationalism—still exist, but their effect on Iran's foreign and security policy has diminished. Concerns about Iraqi aggression, ethnic separatist movements, and economic problems have moved Iran away from pursuing ideological goals to pursuing more practical and cautious goals.

The authors are extremely thorough in their exploration of Iran's behavior and policymaking system and quite effective in revealing the underlying causes of its policy shifts. The only drawback is that the book was published before the events of

11 September 2001, and so does not capture the effects of the many subsequent events that have greatly affected Iranian security.

Overall this book is a wealth of information in a compact, easily understandable form. Any military or Department of Defense professional who needs to rapidly develop an understanding of Iran's military institutions, policy formulation, and security policy since their revolution more than 20 years ago will find the book insightful and useful.

**MAJ James Gavrilis, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, 545 pages, \$28.95.

The national debate on U.S. civil-military relations is alive and heated in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn's book *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. As the title suggests, the book discusses the increasing divide between soldiers, specifically the senior officer corps, and U.S. society, specifically civilian elite society. Although the findings of the book do not substantiate what some have termed a crisis in civil-military affairs, they do find schisms between the two that might, if not addressed, lead to a crisis.

The book is a compilation of several multidisciplinary studies that aim to answer the following questions:

- What is the nature or character of the civil-military gap today?
- What factors shape it?
- Does the gap matter for military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation?
- What, if anything, can and should policymakers do about the gap?

The authors obtained the research data for their work through a survey instrument completed by the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies. Surveying what they considered military and civilian elites, the authors analyzed the survey data and chose 12 of 21 studies to publish. Those studies make up the chapters in the book and are clustered into three sections, each with four chapters.

One section addresses the opinions of the soldiers and civilians surveyed. One section explores the gap in civil-military relations over time—a brief history if you will. The final section explores what implications the gaps have on military effectiveness and the cooperation between civilians and the military.

What the reader will find in this important, scholarly work is that there is a chasm between the military and the civilians it serves. The divide, argue the writers, makes it harder to recruit soldiers; makes it easier for midcareerists to leave the military before retirement because of disillusionment; and makes obtaining funds from Congress difficult.

The authors also discuss many of the problems the average soldier faces, such as high operating tempo and personnel tempo; the difficulty of integrating policies like “don’t ask, don’t tell” into military values; and the apparent disconnect in military values with those of mainstream society’s. Some soldiers might read the findings and believe them intuitively obvious. For instance, the average soldier tends to be more conservative than the average civilian; most officers are inclined to be Republican; that the military believes that the Nation’s political leaders are ignorant about military affairs. What is especially useful, however, is that the book puts those issues out for debate. Not that the debate is new. One writer points out that the debate goes back to 1776 when Samuel Adams suggested that soldiers and citizens are distinctively different and that the former “should be watched with a jealous eye” by the latter.

The book presents much research data that help frame the issues perpetuating the gap between civil-military relations. Although the 9/11 terror attacks have largely placed the debate on the back burner because of the subsequent tremendous cooperation between civilian authorities and senior military leaders, the problems that Feaver and Kohn identify remain.

The solutions the authors propose are fairly straightforward and achievable. They suggest that the military increase its presence in civil

society; improve civilian understanding of military affairs; and strengthen civil-military instruction in professional military education. Through such measures, the gap in understanding can be narrowed.

This is an important book for professional soldiers because the military perspective is often missing in the civil-military debate. The authors have superbly outlined the issues, giving them historical dimension. Most important, the authors articulate the problems as seen through the scope of academia, which naturally facilitates an analysis through military lenses, a logical and needed next step. Quite simply, this is a debate in which professional soldiers should be involved, if not as participants, then certainly as followers of the argument. The issue directly affects the military profession. If civilian elites perceive there are problems, they will likely seek to resolve those problems. If professional soldiers do not engage in the debate, they might have to implement solutions that could perpetuate and enlarge the very gap the solutions aim to close.

MAJ Jesus F. Gomez, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ATLANTA WILL FALL: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions, Stephen Davis, SR Books, Wilmington, DE, 2001, 215 pages, \$55.00.

An Atlanta native and book review editor for *Blue & Gray* magazine, Stephen Davis has written an excel-

lent short history of the decisive Georgia campaign of 1864. Davis covers a large amount of detail in his 214 pages. The result, however is a readable, concise history.

Davis does not let brevity keep him from controversy. He thoroughly reproaches Confederate General Joe Johnston for Johnson’s seemingly endless retreating. Davis praises Union General William T. Sherman’s actions. Davis also gives a sympathetic treatment of Johnston’s successor, Confederate General John Bell Hood and the strategic dilemma he inherited on assuming command of the Army of Tennessee.

On assuming command, Hood was outnumbered three to two; Sherman’s armies were within 8 miles of Atlanta and across the last natural obstacle before Atlanta, the Chattahoochee River. Despite these disadvantages, Hood held Atlanta for 6 weeks and did not give up the town without a fight. Davis states that when Hood took command, the fall of the city was inevitable. I believe Davis underestimates the vulnerability of Sherman’s logistics. This vulnerability was not exploited, but it could have been.

The book’s downside is its price. At \$55 for the hardback, the book seems expensive; the paperback, at \$17.95, is more reasonably priced. For a balanced treatment of an important and decisive campaign, *Atlanta Will Fall* is well worth reading.

LTC D. Jon White, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LETTERS

DOCC— Personnel Recovery

CW5 John D. Wallace, USA, *Fort Hood, Texas*—General Burwell B. Bell’s *Military Review* article, “The New DOCC” (January-February 2003), is informative and well thought out. Bell addresses many deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) prob-

lem areas such as personnel, equipment, and techniques. One area he does not address is personnel recovery (PR). Combatant commanders today direct all units in their areas of responsibility (AOR) to conduct personnel recovery in support of their own operations. If a corps is “JSCP’d” [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan] against a theater, its commander should take the time to read the joint task list and initial AOR-entry PR requirements. A corps’ PR programs

has strategic, operational, and tactical implications, and it stretches the corps PR battlespace from the seaport of debarkation through the ground component's command's forward boundary. Success in personnel recovery will not be achieved by assigning the task to the next available liaison officer.

I suggest that the hub of a viable corps PR program reside in a rescue coordination center in the corps DOCC fusion cell, and that the rescue coordination center position, located within the G3 Air, be staffed by an aviation Chief Warrant Officer 5 with a career field designation "I" or by a tactical operations officer. If staffed by a nonaviation operations

officer, the officer should be trained through the Joint Targeting Staff Course, the Joint Search and Rescue Coordinator Course, the Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course, and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency PR (JPRA) 101/301. The tactical operations officer can provide the corps plans and fusion cell staffs with long-term planning and execution-related institutional knowledge of aviation and PR subject matter. The tactical operations officer should work in the fusion cell via a personnel recovery mission software, mIRC-capable laptop; Tactical Internet, and digital non-secure voice terminal while tethered to the plans cell.

I recommend the corps rescue coordination center position be created by modifying the corps HHC MTOE, FC0103, dated 2 October 2002, which is a direct link to other rescue coordination centers, Theater Joint Search and Rescue Center, JPRA, and national support for PR operations. Although considered aviation-centric, personnel recovery, or its subset, combat search and rescue, is often conducted for nontraditional ground customers, as demonstrated recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In war or peace, the CW5 tactical operations officer in the corps G3 Air rescue coordination center is the subject matter expert for PR training and operations.

